Do more dangerous weapon categories receive more intensive verification under existing treaties? Policy discussions often assume "risk-proportionate governance," where higher-risk technologies warrant stronger oversight. But does this hold empirically across 80 years of arms control?

Arms Control Verification Intensity Explorer

Arms Control Verification Intensity Explorer

Dylan Miars · Makenna Riley · Rebecca Bauman · Yuqin Wang

AMC Research Sprint · Uppsala University · Alva Myrdal Centre · 2026

Top treaty
START I
Score: —
Avg score — high risk
—
nuclear, chemical, biological, strategic
excl. IQR outliers: —
Avg score — low risk
—
conventional / other
excl. IQR outliers: —
High − low difference
—
gap excl. IQR outliers: —
Verification Intensity by Treaty
31 treaties · scores normalized 0–100
Data sources and methodology
  • AMC Arms Control Agreement Database V2 — Alva Myrdal Centre, Uppsala University
  • † Manually coded: JCPOA, Quadripartite Agreement, Brazil-Argentina Coop → high risk; Open Skies, CFE Adaptation, BDA Agreement, Sub-Regional Arms Control → low risk
How to Use
A quick guide to exploring this tool
  • Drag the sliders in the left panel to reweight each variable — the chart and stats recalculate instantly
  • Click the legend buttons above the chart to filter by risk tier or inspector type
  • Hover over any bubble to see that treaty's full score breakdown
  • Click on the bubble itself to go to the text of the treaty
  • Click "↺ Reset to our weights" in the sidebar to restore the default weighting
  • Bubble size reflects the number of verified compliance mechanisms in each treaty

I’d like to thank my dear friends and colleagues Makenna Riley, Rebecca Bauman, and Yuqin Wang for their great insights and collaboration on this project. I’d also like to thank Dr. Sophia Hatz and the team at Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament for hosting the research sprint and for developing such a valuable dataset to use.

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